The Iso-Agglutination Test as Evidence in Judicial Proceedings in German Courts to Determine Parenthood by Schumacher, Willy, M.D.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 8 
Number 2 Volume 8, May 1934, Number 2 Article 4 
June 2014 
The Iso-Agglutination Test as Evidence in Judicial Proceedings in 
German Courts to Determine Parenthood 
Willy Schumacher M.D. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Schumacher, Willy M.D. (1934) "The Iso-Agglutination Test as Evidence in Judicial Proceedings in German 
Courts to Determine Parenthood," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 8 : No. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE ISO-AGGLUTINATION TEST AS EVIDENCE IN
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN GERMAN COURTS
TO DETERMINE PARENTHOOD*
O UTSIDE of criminal proceedings the application of the
Siso-agglutination test plays a part mainly in proceed-
ings involving the judicial determination of parenthood.
For example, a certain man is sought as putative father
of an illegitimate child, to be held chargeable with its sup-
port. His defense usually is that the child obviously could
not have been conceived by him. To prove the impossibility
he will ask for an iso-agglutination test. Similarly, a claim
by the putative father that a specified third person who had
sexual commerce with the mother during the period of con-
ception was the father of the illegitimate child, will be met
on the part of the child whose paternity is assailed by an
iso-agglutination test to prove that the defense is impossible.
Whether the iso-agglutination test will fulfill properly
its function as effective evidence in proceedings of that char-
acter will, of course, depend upon the degree of recognition
the test will receive in the courts.
A great conflict of opinion has prevailed in Germany in
recent times concerning this question, nor have the legal
implications of it been definitely decided.
Although the most eminent scientific authorities in the
domain of the biology of heredity have been unanimous that
the test will yield in proper cases conclusive proof that a
certain specific individual could not be progenitor of another
specific individual, the courts in Germany, in contrast
to the Austrian courts, have shown much reserve on the
question.'
The Eighth Civilsenat of the Kammergericht of Berlin
in its well-known decision of the 2nd October 1927 (8 W.
4228-27 in J. W. 27, S. 2862) and 12th October 1928 (8 W.
8648-28 in J. W. 29, S. 467) especially has held the iso-
* Translated by S. R. Wachtell of the New York Bar.
'Feststellung Sperls in Dt. Jur. Ztg. S. 1523, Jgg. 27; ferner 0. G. H.
Wien v. 16. III. 1927; 0. G. H. Brunn, in J. W. 1930, S. 1631; vergl. aber
neuerdings die zuruckhaltende Entscheidung des 0. G. H. Wien vom 31. LO.
28 in J. W. 1929. S. 467.
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agglutination test not sufficiently reliable to base thereon a
conclusive finding of the impossibility of descent of a given
individual from another by generation, within the purview
of section 1717 of the German Civil Code.
The court in these decisions, pointing to certain "excep-
tions" established by those learned in the subject, concluded
that to prove "obvious impossibility" it will not suffice to
establish that "according to medical practice and theory the
descent is excluded," 2 for that would contravene the legally
prescribed requirement of "absence of all doubt" which
would result only from an extended and infallible observa-
tion of a sufficiently large and varied material, giving cer-
tainty to the empirical rule.
According to this requirement, every possibility of any
other procreation of the child must be excluded not only
under the theoretical principles of the science but under its
practical applications, before a finding of "obvious impossi-
bility" will be justified. The court's reasoning is as follows:
That natural science knows empirical laws of such thor-
oughly established certainty can hardly be doubted. Should
further research prove that these propositions cannot be
maintained as subject to no exception, it would result that
the exceptional provisions of the law which would follow
from these propositions could no longer be applied. Even
the greatest probability will not satisfy section 1717, which
demands certainty. One therefore cannot speak of "obvious
impossibility" so long as even the remotest chance exists of
the procreation of the issue of an act of sexual commerce.
But the fundamental principle of the immutability of blood
groups is subject to many exceptions, as shown by modern
research workers. So long as the causes of these exceptions
remain unexplained, every case under investigation may be
claimed to be a case falling within the exceptions. Theoreti-
cally it would be entirely permissible to speak of an unknown
departure from the rule of heredity even in the case of blood
groups. The required "obvious impossibility" of section
1717 in the sense of a procreation which is unthinkable, is
therefore not sufficiently established. Moreover, the prac-
2 Hinweis auf Strassman in J. W. 1927 S. 2862.
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tical handling of blood test investigations offers an unman-
ageable infirmity.
Vigorous protest has come from medical 3 as well as
judicial4 quarters against this evaluation of the iso-agglu-
tination test by the Kammergericht. Moreover, in spite of
the attitude of the Prussian Kammergericht, many courts of
first instance and intermediate appellate courts have admit-
ted the test as competent legal evidence.5
The Kammergericht has committed many errors. In
the first place, its construction of the concept of "obvious
impossibility" in the sense of theoretical, or rather mathe-
matical, impossibility, is erroneous. Principles in medicine
or natural science can never yield mathematical certitude
since these empirical propositions are based upon an experi-
mental examination of a certain number of cases, but never
upon all the cases. To establish whether in any given case
the claim of an indicated paternity is "obviously impossible"
the judge must proceed upon the basis of the circumstances
of the particular case. The statute, therefore, could not
have intended a mathematical but only an empirical deter-
mination which might establish an overwhelming probabil-
ity but never an absolute certainty. "Obviously impossible"
can therefore mean only-as in the Austrian law 0--that
under the given circumstances it is so unlikely that the child
in question is descended from the putative father that to
hold the opposite would be against reason. The Reichs-
gericht shared this opinion for many years.7  An overwhelm-
ing majority of the text writers likewise adopt this view.7a
a vergl. die Aufsatze von Werkgartner-Strassman in J. W. 1928, S. 867;
von Dr. Schiff in Dt. Ztschr. fur die ges. ger. Medizin Bd. 9. S. 385 ff.
' vergl. Heliwig in J. W. 1928, S. 867 if; in Jr. Rdsch. 1929. S. 168; und
177; ders. in J. W. 1930. S. 1556. Caro in J. W. 1929, S. Sperl a. a. 0.Urteil des 0. L. G. in Konigsberg v. 14. 6. 29 ;-2. U. 182/28 in J. W.
1930 S. 82; Beschluss des 0. L. G. Oldenburg, 1. Z. Sen. v. 17. 4. 29-W,
37/29. Rdbrf. der Dt. Amtsvormum der V. 43. Beschuless des 0. L. G. Koln
6. Z. Sen. v. 28. 5. 29 in 6. w. 121/29, des 0. L. G. Dusseldorf, v. 6. 3. 29.-7.
S. 47/29, des 0. L. G. Stuttgart v. 10. III. 28-3. W. 117/28; des 0. L. G.
Naumburg, v. 9. 12. 27-5. W.-421/27 und a. mehr.
'Das Oester. Gesetz kennt aber nur den Begriff "unmoglich" ohne das
Wort "offenbar." Jedoch ist die Bedeutung dieselbe wie im dt. Recht, so:
Sperl: a. a. 0. ferner 0. G. H. Wien v. 16. III. 27/usw. dagegen Leonhard in
J. W. 1929, S. 30.
'Entscbeidg. in Bd. 15. S. 330 Urt. v.-14.I. 1884; R. G. St. Bd. 61. S. 202.
'a Stein-Jonas Komm. zur Z. P. 0. zu Sec. 286 I; Caro in J. W. 1929,
S. 2230; Heusler, Arc Civ. Praxis, 62, S. S. 217 ff.
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The Reichsgericht considers it of no importance that
expert opinion would decline to say that the appearance of
an abnormal case running counter to present experience is
unthinkable, since the concept of "obvious impossibility" is
satisfied by the highest probability, which does not exclude
the remote probability of an exception. The judge must be
satisfied with a degree of probability which in practical
daily life will be considered conclusive.
It must be considered in this connection that until now,
according io the statements of the most outstanding scien-
tists in that field (Professor Thomsen, Dr. Schiff, Professor
Abderhalden, etc.) on whose results the Kammergericht based
its judgments, no real exceptions have been demonstrated,
and that the exceptions announced until now are only appar-
ent ones, since the identity of the children examined was
not established.8 The number of such apparent exceptions,
based upon insufficient identification, established in mass
examinations, will vary, naturally, with the moral status of
any given community. But it is not always possible to
establish that the exception is only an apparent one. The
requirement of the Kammergericht, therefore, that evidence
be produced of the basis of all exceptions, is not feasible.
The blood test method would have to be abandoned if these
exceptions could not be explained. It would be more just,
in view of the regularity, generally, of the result of the tests
until now, to require him who questions the conclusiveness
of any test, to prove his contentions.sa
After the examining committee of the Federal Health
Council handed down on opinion (May 6th, 1929) that the
iso-agglutination test is entirely reliable and constitutes a
conclusive test of descent, the Kammergericht abandoned its
view of the incompetency of the test and in an order issued
on April 4th, 1930, 9 permitted evidence of the test in court.
Thereby uniformity of decision in the German courts has
again been established, especially since the Reichsgericht
I Thomsen, Hospitalstidende 1928, S. 331, Nr. 13; Dr. Schiff: Die Technik
der Blutgruppenuntersuchung fur Kliniker und Gerichtsarzte, 2 Auflaje-,"-Ber-lin, 1929, S. 7ff Dt. Ztschr. f. die ges. ger. Medizin, Bd. 7, S. 360 ff Lattes, L,
individualite du sang Paris, 1929. 192 ff ua.
% vergl. auch Helivig, Jur. Rdsch. 1929, S. 180 ff.
0 Aktenz.: 8, W. 8557/29, J. W. 1930, S. 1605.
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has in principle accepted the iso-agglutination test as
competent. 10
Still, all the impediments to the application of the iso-
agglutination test in litigation involving questions of pater-
nity as well as in other legal proceedings have by no means
been removed. The greatest difficulty is to be found in the
fact that neither the parties (that is, the putative father and
the child whose paternity is in question) nor the witnesses
(that is, the mother as well as the third person charged
with the act of sexual commerce resulting in the birth of
the child) can be compelled to undergo the test. All these
persons have the right to refuse to subject themselves to the
test, just as all persons generally have the right to refuse
invasions of their bodies.1  Nor can one be bound to the
test by agreement, for the execution of the test in the face of
a last-minute revocation of a previously granted consent
would constitute a crime as well as an actionable assault.
In addition, the fundamental principle that one is not
obliged to furnish evidence against himself by an examina-
tion of his body, here still finds application. The provisions
of law for compelling a party to give evidence against him-
self are narrowly limited to specific cases, such as, princi-
pally, the examination of documents. An extension of these
provisions to include blood tests is not legally permissible.
Such an extension would require an amendment of the
statutes.'
2
Nor is it part of the duty of witnesses to permit the
test. That duty, according to German law, includes only
the giving of testimony under oath of facts within their
knowledge. It does not even include the production of in-
struments, not to mention the production of their bodies for
experimental purposes or even inspection. According to
German law, therefore, the abstraction of a drop of blood
without the consent of the person concerned would amount
to a constitutional violation of the provisions of Article 114
of the Constitution guaranteeing liberty of the person, and
10 vergL besonders R. G. Z. v. 5. 6. 1930,--IV. 188/30.
U so das Kammergericht in Dt. J.-Ztg. 1929, Sp. 1348; K. G. v. 4. 4. 1930
a. a. 0. R.-G. Urt. v. 5. 6. 1930-IV. 188/30; R. G. v. 16.5-30, zur Veroffent-
lichung in der amtl. Sammiung bestimmt.
12 so auch die Vorschlage in der neuesten einschlagigen Rechtsliteratur.
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subject the one doing so to an action for damages under the
authority of Section 823 B. G. B. (Civil Law Code); and
the act could be regarded as a criminal bodily assault under
Section 223 St. G. B. (Penal Law Code). s Every physician
engaged in the preparation or execution of the blood tests
would therefore have to be on his guard. That is the view
of the Oberste Gerichtshof, the Reichsgericht, and the Prus-
sian Kammergericht.14 Both courts rejected the recommen-
dations of the text writers for a compulsory blood test as
impossible under German law.15 The developments of the
foreign law on the subject, however, are interesting, particu-
larly in Austria and in the United States of America. The
Austrian case law I' (the Obersten Gerichtshofes in Vienna)
regards the view expressed by the text writers 17 in support
of a compulsory blood test as a corollary to the duty of a
witness to give evidence, and consequently as subject to the
court's order. The refusal of the witness will there be
regarded as a refusal to co-operate in the interests of justice
and, hence, not entitled to the protection of the courts. Wit-
nesses must therefore consent to the abstraction of the drop
of blood if they would avoid the penalties provided for a
contumacious witness.
The case law in the United States goes even further.
The Supreme Court of the United States, it is true, at one
time considered that to compel a person to undergo a physi-
cal examination was a violation of the Federal Constitution.
But today parties as well as witnesses are subject to a com-
pulsory physical examination.
It happens often in the German courts that parties and
witnesses, especially official guardians,' 8 refuse the blood
test with the statement that they are under no obligation to
facilitate the production of evidence for their adversaries.
The result of this refusalL-practiced also by official guar-
dians-is that the one charged with the burden of proof-
Uvergl. die Kommentare, zu Sections 383 ff Z. P. 0., insbes. Gaupp-Stein.
"'vergl. oben Anmn. 11.isso Caro, J. W. 1030, S. 1605.
110. G. H. Wien. Urt. v. 267. 4.27; -II. 216/27, Sper-, Oesterr.
Richterztg., Juli, August 1926, S. 177; 180; und Sperl, Dt. J. Ztg. 1927.
S. 1523 ff.
" Sperl, a. a. 0.
bezuglich ihres Mundels. Vergl. die gleichen Verhaltnisse in Oesterr.
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usually the putative father-is deprived of the evidence of
"obvious impossibility." This condition, undesirable in the
interests of justice, could be remedied if the refusal to con-
sent to the blood test would be punished with an adverse
presumption against the party or witness refusing or the
parties benefitted by the refusal: if it would be presumed,
for instance, that the putative father's denial of paternity
would be regarded as true where he is deprived in this man-
ner from producing his evidence. In this case it would be
considered that the evidence of the "obvious impossibility"
of the paternity charge, required by section 1717 B. G. B.
has been established. The idea of such a presumption,
coupled with a judicial acceptance of the refusal as proof
in lieu of evidence (section 286 Z. P. O.-Code of Civil
Procedure) has much in its favor, especially as there already
exists a presumption of curability in the case of a person
refusing to undergo qn operation necessary for his cure, with
the consequent rejection of his claim for further damages. 9
In view of the inexpensiveness and simplicity of the test and
the absence of all danger and pain in connection with it, it is
certainly just to suspect the veracity of the claim of the
party refusing. From this point of view the refusal for
which the parties must be responsible if it takes place with
their consent, or, at their instance, resulting, as it must, in
the deprivation of the adversary of the means to prove the
truth of his assertions must be regarded as immoral and in
bad faith. Text writers 20 and decisions 21 have in this sense
been unanimous in interpreting the refusal of the mother as
equivalent to proof of "obvious impossibility" by applying
the judicial presumption mentioned.
But the number of decisions contra is much greater.
Thus, the Prussian Kammergericht in its order of the 4th
April 1930 22 declined to make the adverse presumption upon
the ground that the one refusing did not do so with the con-
" R. G. Z. Bd. 60. s. 152 r .g. Urt. v. 12. 7. 30-IX. 54/30; Bd. 83. S. 15;
R. V. A. Urt. v. 5. II.-29-IIa. 2393/28 zu Section 1306 R. V. 0. Schlager,
Jur. Rdsch. 29, S. 93 ua.
so Caro, J. W. 1930, a. a. 0.; und Sperl. Dt. Zur. Ztg. a. a. 0.
L. G. Altona, Urt. v. 24 II. 1930-6. 8. 344/29 in J. W. 1930 S. 1616 und
die in ihm onthaltenen Literatur nachweise; Onet, in J. W. 1929, 2290 Bespr.
zum Urt. des 0. L. G. Munchen, v. 11. 12. 28; Strassmann; J. W.-1930, 82.
' Aktenz.: 8 W. 8557/20 in Rdbrf. des A. Dr. Berfsvorm. VI. Igg. S. 6.
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sciousness that thereby he has deprived the adversary of his
means of proof, because no one undergoing the test is able to
decide definitely whether there will be a failure of the blood
groups to agree and thus constitute an absolute refutation of
the claim of descent. The consciousness of the possibility
that such a result might follow from the examination does
not amount to the same thing. More is therefore necessary
in the way of special circumstances to stamp the refusal as
being in bad faith. But this ground would not seem to be
tenable, for in law and precedent conduct predicated upon
consciousness of a possibility of damage to another is re-
garded as immoral and sometimes even as criminal.
Also in its judgment of the 5th of June, 1930,23 the
Reichsgericht refused to make the adverse presumption upon
the ground that the method of the iso-agglutination test, so
far, has established, at most, in only about 8% of the exami-
nations a finding against paternity by a specific person. It
could, therefore, not be justifiable under any circumstances
to treat the refusal to be examined in such a way as to put
the adversary into the favored position accorded only to 8%
of the examined cases. A further ground for the rejection
is to be found also in the fact that persons have declined to
undergo the iso-agglutination test for fear of its reliability
as evidence. Only when confidence in the reliability of the
experiment will have been sufficiently spread among the
people will it be possible to draw the adverse presumptions
mentioned.
These reasons of the Reichsgericht appear unconvincing.
If the refusal persists even after detailed explanation by
the court relative to the certainty of the test, without suffi-
cient reasons being given, here appears room for doubt of
the good faith of the person refusing. This attitude on the
part of the higher court will also be decisive of the attitude
of the lower courts, so that the effectiveness of the blood
test to establish the truth will often be shattered by a refusal
of the parties concerned to undergo it.
These decisions have gone to the far-reaching extent to
deny the rights granted by the Poor Law if the applicant
'Aktenz. IV. 188/30.
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does not submit with his pauper's petition a consent of the
parties to subject themselves to the abstraction of blood for
the test. This follows because according to the view of some
courts, 4 the Kammergericht among them, the chances of a
successful prosecution of the suit in the absence of such a
consent would be too unfavorable since the applicant will
not be in a position to produce the evidence for his claim.
Fundamentally, therefore, the failure to produce this con-
sent has the result of making the Poor Law in this respect a
nullity. This result now has a sharp incidence on the popu-
lation since many sections thereof are dependent upon the
Poor Laws for the enforcement of their legal rights. This
attitude of the courts is erroneous inasmuch as the test of a
pauper's petition is not the nature of his prospects to pro-
duce the necessary evidence but the nature of his legal right
in and for itself. Nevertheless, this position of the Kammer-
gericht will for the time being, of course, be decisive of the
attitude of the lower courts.
It follows from these decisions that the iso-agglutination
test, while competent as evidence, may be entirely eliminated
as such by the permissible refusal of the parties to furnish
blood for the test. The test, therefore, does not by far play
the role which it is entitled to by reason of the certitudi
attending its results over and above other evidence, and the
means it furnishes to eliminate the uncertain and trouble-
making testimony of witnesses as the sole basis of the court's
decision. The right which is unjustly accorded to parties
and witnesses to refuse the test, is to blame for this situa-
tion. Since the civil as well as criminal codes at present in
existence contain no machinery for the compulsion of per-
sons to the test by legal means, a change of these laws is
necessary. Proposals for such legislation are to be found
in legal literature in profusion.
WILLY SCHUMACHER, M.D.
Bonn, Germany.
K. G. Beschluss v. 4. 4. 1930-8 W. 8557/29; 0. L. G. Stuttgart v.
10. 3. 28-2 W. 117 in J. W. 1928 S. 2160, die es allerdings genugend sein lasst.
wenn der Antragstellerdie Einwilligung nur glaubhaft behauptet.
